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Abstract
This paper examines the role of filial piety in East Asian Confucian societies as a means of 
drawing out political implications by showing two different standpoints elaborated by Gadamer 
and Habermas. The two thinkers seem to display different outlooks on the notion of filial piety 
in the East Asian Confucian culture: Whereas Gadamer appears to approve the practice of 
filial piety as keeping tradition in the specific societies, i.e., Confucian East Asian culture, 
Habermas rejects it by refusing the concept of tradition. The debate primarily originates from 
two different—though both “Western”—philosophical traditions. Gadamer endorses tradition 
since all human beings are conditioned by the effects of cultural heritage, and events can never 
be disinterested. All previous contexts of human culture enter into the greater tradition that 
is transmitted to us through the generations as an inexhaustible stock of moral instruction. 
On the other hand, in his critique of Gadamer’s appropriation of tradition, Habermas argues 
that human beings can overcome the dogmatic force of tradition. In Habermas’s account, it 
is of significant importance to use reason—or critical reflection—in order to overcome such 
dogmatic force. In short, this paper appropriates Habermas’s charge that Gadamer hypostatizes 
tradition. In other words, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics embeds understanding in 
tradition because all understanding is necessarily prejudiced. Habermas rejects Gadamer’s idea 
of tradition on the ground that it is absolutizing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Confucian East Asian societies are fundamentally characterized by explicit social 
hierarchy. In other words, the hierarchy that structures relationships between 
parents and children, males and females, and ruler and ruled, is what conditions 
conventional morality in Confucian tradition. The hierarchical foundation of the 
family and society, expressed in terms of three bonds (Sangang, 三綱; father-
son, husband-wife, and ruler-ruled),2 is the aspect of  Confucian tradition that is 
most criticized. Social hierarchy is also reinforced by the continuity of relations 
with one’s parents long into one’s adulthood. Even today, Asian adults have close, 
dependent ties to their parents. This is intended as an expression of compassion 
and respect for those who gave life to, nurtured, and taught one to behave in a 
civilized fashion, but often, this dependency infantilizes an otherwise grown person 
by subordinating one to parental demands. It is a discourse wherein Confucian 
cultural issues lie in an understanding of how those values are manifested in the 
lives of those who inherit the tradition and authority. The unconditional instilling 
of hierarchical relationships, of tradition and authority that serve as the standards 
of East Asian Confucian culture, provides the basis of judgment for each member 
of the society. The emphasis on filial piety as a means of upholding the Confucian 
values of tradition and authority should be reconsidered to raise doubts concerning 
these problems.
This paper examines the possibilities for the normative grounding of the role 
of reason and tradition by focusing on Gadamer and Habermas—with particular 
reference to an analysis of filial piety as practiced in East Asian culture. It places 
great weight on the concept of filial piety, particularly because it is a significant 
cultural practice to explore the normative underpinning of tradition. Gadamer’s 
standpoint locates the conditions of authority in tradition, while Habermas offers 
a theory of communicative action that transcends the limited horizons of tradition. 
The concept of filial piety is a phenomenon specific to Confucian East Asian 
culture. However, it can be used as a tool in exploring whose argument, Gadamer’s 
or Habermas’s, has more relevance.3 The essential problem with filial piety is that 
it appears incompatible with the values of freedom and equality. This is due to the 
most important principle of filial piety: that the children must yield unconditionally 
to their parents’ authority. Habermas’s critical perspective can break open the 
power relations at the heart of filial piety, yet this should not be interpreted as a 
rejection of respect for parents. Rather, it is a demand for the reorientation of that 
relationship—and by extension, the relationship to political authority—away from 
tradition to reason. 
The debate between Habermas and Gadamer concerns the status and authority 
of tradition and the legitimatization of political authority. This debate mirrors the 
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one found in moral philosophy concerning the status of values. We are accustomed 
to saying that values express freedom and creative spontaneity—that is, its 
capacity to both assess and develop projects. On the other hand, there appears 
to be a hierarchy of values that we receive and that we ought to acknowledge as 
something not merely created or established by choice. Values appear to be able 
to orient our actions only because, in the final analysis, they do not depend on us 
for their validity. In examining the different positions of Habermas and Gadamer, 
Habermas sees that uncritical authority and tradition can be improved by means 
of critical reflection, while Gadamer contends that tradition and authority should 
be maintained. This paper investigates the concept of filial piety, which is one of 
the most important characteristics of Confucian East Asian culture, through the 
lens of Habermas and Gadamer, and their debate about tradition. Using filial piety 
as a focus, it will try to explain the difference in the positions of Habermas and 
Gadamer in their abstract philosophical debate in a more concrete manner. 
2. CONFUCIANISM AND THE CONCEPT OF FILIAL PIETY 
Confucianism is one of the most significant Eastern philosophies and has influenced 
East Asian society for more than two millennia. It has entirely permeated the way 
of life of people in East Asian societies. In other words, it has played an important 
role as both a conscious political ideology and a “taken-for-granted” everyday 
social ethic. Indeed, this fact also explains its capacity to permeate everyday life. 
Education, family structure, government and the general values of East Asia have 
been affected, to varying degrees, by Confucianism (Roetz, “Confucianism and 
Familism” 41). Although it would be an exaggeration to state that all conventional 
life and culture of East Asia are Confucian in a narrow sense, to a significant degree, 
Confucianism can be used in a broad sense as a label for East Asian culture. 
As Ronald indicates, Confucianism is “a code of ethics for family and social 
life based on filial piety, [which] is strongly integrated into household and family 
practices” (56). Confucius believed that filial piety should be regarded as a primary 
form to arrive at the moral excellence of humanity (Yong Huang 6), and argued 
that personal dignity can be enhanced by cultivating genuine feelings for one’s 
parents (Tu, “Confucius and Confucianism” 13). Confucius thought that family was 
of greatest significance because human beings could learn fundamental virtues 
through it (Roetz, “Confucianism between Tradition” 369). For Confucianism, “the 
first test for our self-cultivation is our ability to cultivate meaningful relationships 
with our family members” (Tu, “Confucius and Confucianism” 13). The fundamental 
Confucian virtue of humanity (ren, 仁),4 is the ultimate product of self-cultivation. In 
Confucius’ writings, the most significant and distinctive elements in the father-son 
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relationship are those concerned with the absolute obedience and respect of the 
son for his father. While it is argued by Tu that the son should encourage and 
nurture himself, he must also learn self-control, and subsequently be able to 
overcome feelings of desire, recognize the requirements of his father, and regard 
with reverence his father’s requests (Confucian Thought 115). 
We can thus summarize the concern for filial piety through a series of questions: 
What is filial piety? Why is the concept of filial piety particularly important in East 
Asian culture? What are the political implications of filial piety? And crucial to this 
paper—is it possible to criticize filial piety from a standpoint that transcends East 
Asian culture, and in so doing, reconstruct the basis of political authority in that 
culture? 
In East Asian culture, the concept of filial piety (xiao, 孝) has a deep, long, and 
complex history. The family is considered to be society’s individual organizing 
element, and the ethics associated with filial piety, particularly in relation to 
Confucianism, has ultimately developed into the distinguishing element of the 
moral identity of Eastern culture. As a result, the ethical standpoints concerning 
Confucianism penetrate every level of life within the societies of East Asia (Kunio 
110). From the perspective of Confucius, the notion of filial piety formed the initial 
element in the process of achieving an ideal moral character. In Book II of the 
Analects, there are four passages in which Confucius explains to his disciples the 
definition of filial piety:
When your parents are alive, serve them according to the rule of propriety. When they 
die, bury them according to the rules of propriety and sacrifice to them according to the 
rules of propriety. (Lau, Analects 2.5) 
Give your father and mother no other cause for anxiety than illness. (Lau, Analects 2.6) 
Nowadays for a man to be filial means no more than that he is able to provide his parents 
with food. Even dogs and horses are, in some ways, provided with food. If a man shows 
no reverence, where is the difference? (Lau, Analects 2.7) 
What is difficult to manage is the expression on one’s face. As for the young taking on the 
burden when there is work to be done or letting the old enjoy the wine and food when 
these are available, that hardly deserves to be called filial. (Lau, Analects 2.8) 
We can take from these injunctions that Confucius regards filial piety as not just 
ensuring the provision of ritual burial and materialistic requirements. In other 
words, filial piety and its overall practice should not be considered as merely 
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ritualistic, but rather as guiding action in everyday life, and those who practice 
filial piety should be sincere in the performance of their filial duties. 
In the context of East Asian culture, Confucianism is distinctive such that great 
emphasis has been placed on the role of the family. The family is never a subordinate 
element of political life, nor can it be transcended. As Jordan contends, the concept 
of filial piety in Confucian culture is a central concern in all thinking about moral 
human behavior:
Filial piety is simultaneously (and ambiguously) both a mental state and a behavioural 
code, and the behavioural code is (also simultaneously and also ambiguously) both a 
set of actions and a system of values underlying those actions. Thus we find that filial 
piety in Confucian culture may be defined in three quite separate ways: (1) filiality as 
action directed toward a parent and exhibiting submission and nurturance; (2) filiality 
as an emotion of love toward a parent that is understood to differ from other sorts of 
attachment (filial piety as emotion is particularly vivid in the context of funerals, which 
provide strong cultural support for this interpretation of a mourning child’s affect); (3) 
filiality in children as part of a system of values, which must be self-consciously cultivated. 
(271-272) 
Filial piety in Confucian culture provides the foundation of emotional love and 
faithfulness of children to parents, but it also generates an authoritarian social 
structure in which social relations are fundamentally hierarchical. With filial 
piety, hierarchical relationships exist across generations, and there are permanent 
obligations of respect, reverence, and obedience. It bestows a privileged position 
not only on the older generation over the younger generation and the parents over 
the children, but also the male over the female, since the obligations are directed 
toward the father. Thus, filial piety is also patriarchal. As Liem argues, filial piety 
maintains the “emotional link between recollection and trans-generational inner 
reality” (75). Filial piety has played a fundamental role in the society of East Asia as 
a way of guaranteeing both ontological security—meaning it provides a sense of self 
or personhood—and general social hierarchy (Hashimoto 196). The importance 
and influence of filial piety in East Asian societies are undisputed characteristics, 
and its consequences are also unmistakable. Therefore, it can be stated that the 
notion of filial piety has been utilized as a means of achieving progress in terms 
of Confucian culture, spanning numerous generations. In addition, filial piety and 
its practices have formed a way of life in Confucian culture and have ultimately 
stipulated the rules and expectations in terms of power and duty between children 
and parents, which then further support and reinforce the societal hierarchy 
present in the Confucian societies of Eastern Asia.
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A concrete illustration of filial piety in South Korea would serve as a good 
example of how, in Confucian culture, the practice of filial piety plays out as a 
dominant political ideology. Filial piety can be viewed from two perspectives: 
empirically, as a “lived practice,” and ideologically as a body of thought which 
reflects upon that lived practice and seeks to justify it. That justification focuses 
both on the immediate relationship between parent (primarily the father) and 
child, and on the wider social and political role of filial piety—specifically its role 
in justifying political authority. The focus of this paper is mainly on filial piety as 
ideology, because it is concerned with the reasons we give one another. This is 
central to the debate between Gadamer and Habermas, but it is also important to 
recognize that filial piety is a real, lived experience in East Asian culture, albeit one 
that is subject to change and reinterpretation over time. 
There is no simple or straightforward relationship between practice and 
ideology because ideology is a form of practice. This idea of filial piety as ideology is 
illustrated by the development of the “Filial Piety Prize” in South Korea. This prize 
was established by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in 1973 and is awarded 
annually to about 250 people who are nominated by their local community or a 
private organization (Sung and Song 37). In 2008, the “Act on the Encouragement 
and Support for Filial Behavior” was enacted in 2007 and came into effect in August 
4, 2008, in order to promote good cultural heritage of filial piety at the national level 
in South Korea. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of South Korea awarded 
the Filial Piety Prize to 130 people on Mother’s Day in 2016 (Lee 179). According 
to Sung and Song, the purpose of the prize is twofold: “To preserve the value of 
filial piety as a cultural heritage of the nation, and…to stress the importance of the 
practice of filial piety, the idea of parental care, in order to impede the decline of 
elderly care” (37). The latter rationale would not be unfamiliar to Western observers, 
for the more support members of a family provide for one another, the less reliant 
they are on state spending. However, the effectiveness of the prize depends on a 
background set of values which are non-Western. 
Sung and Song undertook a content analysis of the “stories” that accompany 
each prize. In effect, the stories are the explanations for why a prize was awarded. 
They grouped the reasons together and found that in 85% of the stories “showing 
respect for parents” was indicated, followed by “fulfilling filial responsibility” (84%), 
“repaying debts to parents” (71%), “harmonising the family” (46%), “making filial 
sacrifices” (43%), “showing filial sympathy” (26%), “maintaining family continuity” 
(20%), “compensating for undone services” (10%), “providing services to other 
elders” (6%), “complying with religious teachings” (5%), and “maintaining family 
honour” (5%) (43). Some of these beg further questioning: “Filial responsibility” 
and “filial sacrifice” presuppose that the public knows what is meant by the term 
“filial.” The overall point is two-fold: on the one hand, the need to institute a prize 
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would suggest that filial piety is in decline, but the possibility that the prize could 
be effective suggests that the Korean state thinks that the practice still has sufficient 
force for it to motivate people. Clearly, this is an ideological manipulation of an 
ancient practice.
3. THE REINFORCEMENT OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY BASED ON FILIAL PIETY 
It is certainly possible that two different forms of relationship exist: one that is 
harmonious and equal, and another, which is hierarchical and inegalitarian. While 
the former assumes that a non-conflictual relationship can exist between individuals, 
the latter inevitably entails conflict. To a certain degree, human relationships 
necessarily involve some idea of equality, or at least of mutual dependence. The 
fundamental issue is whether there is a deeper moral equality, and how that moral 
equality fits with the hierarchy of Eastern culture, underpinned by filial piety. In 
the case of Western culture, the performance of filial piety—insofar as we can say 
that the phenomenon exists in the West—is built on personal choice, as opposed 
to obligations and duties, which is applicable to both children and parents. On the 
other hand, there is much emphasis placed on obligations and duties in an Eastern 
context. In the West, filial piety is potentially a threat to personal autonomy. From 
a Western perspective, the practice of filial piety in Confucian culture is viewed as 
detrimental to the pursuit of individuality and personal autonomy, and it cannot 
fully guarantee equal rights (Yusheng Huang 40; Fan 516). 
The ultimate core of filial piety is apparent in those children who illustrate 
“absolute obligation with regard to their parents, an obligation that trumps all other 
demands and moral concerns” (Ivanhoe 197). The formation of the traditional 
family in Confucian culture stems from a hierarchical social structure (Slote 
39) in which ultimate authority rests with the father and husband. In this sense, 
parents (especially the father) have an all-powerful and all-fulfilling authoritarian 
potency, and their authority finally leads to “fear, dependency, and hostility” in 
the Confucian family system (Slote 46). Filial piety is not only concerned with 
gratitude and kindness, and subsequent debt and obligation, but also encompasses 
acknowledgement of the fact that kindness was awarded by someone in a much 
more powerful position. Such a notion can help to achieve a deeper level of 
understanding of why those who follow the tradition of Confucianism regularly 
state that filial piety is the most natural model in determining the best relationship 
between subject and ruler, or child and parent (Ivanhoe 196-197).
The level of consciousness surrounding the notion of filial piety in East Asian 
Confucian societies complements the hierarchical relationship and social structure 
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within society to a certain degree. The Classic of Filial Piety5 (XiaoJing, 孝經) is 
one of the key documents in the advancement of filial piety as a broader means 
of reinforcing social hierarchy. The book comprises a compilation of key accounts 
of the practice of filial piety with the aim of emphasizing and reiterating the 
Confucian ethics associated with filial piety. This is done with the overall objective 
of contributing to and developing the level of education within those East Asian 
countries adopting the Confucian tradition. It is noteworthy that for Confucius, 
the application of filial piety is not restricted to private or individual virtues, which 
can only be practiced within family institutions. For example, in the Analects, 
the concept of filial piety is considered to be the source of the moral character 
exemplified by persons within the political sphere: 
It is rare for someone who has a sense of filial and fraternal responsibility to have a 
taste for defying authority. And it is unheard of for those who have no taste for defying 
authority to be keen on initiating rebellion. Exemplary persons concentrate their efforts 
on the root, for the root having taken hold, the way will grow therefrom. As for filial and 
fraternal responsibility, it is, I suspect, the root of humanity (ren, 仁). (Lau, Analects 1.2) 
Therefore, in the familial sphere, filial piety is considered to be the ultimate 
foundation for one’s own moral capacities in the political sphere. Of course, filial 
piety is predominantly directed to an individual’s own parents. However, the 
general arena of filial piety ultimately reaches far beyond the family sphere and 
advances to that of the state. Filial piety as outlined in The Classic of Filial Piety 
is implemented by aiding one’s own parents in the familial sphere, but in so doing 
one emphasizes one’s ancestry, and this results in dedication and service to the 
state. As highlighted by Chai and Chai, both political and social duties and the 
tradition of ancestral adoration in East Asian tradition are combined to form a 
key doctrine (326-327). In sum, it should be acknowledged that filial piety may be 
considered an initial education for what is to follow when serving the state in East 
Asian Confucian societies. 
The Classic of Filial Piety introduces the key idea that filial piety is the ultimate 
root of all that is great; therefore, any person who embodies the qualities associated 
with filial piety would ultimately also encompass all other beneficial qualities and 
virtues (J. Liu 77). Thus filial piety extends to the political arena, so that serving 
one’s royal monarch is also included as one strives to fulfil filial obligations. Filially 
pious behaviors must, therefore, be divided into stages: The notion of serving 
one’s own parents is only the first stage of several. It is ultimately required that 
an individual provides his or her parents with pride and joy through by one’s own 
monarch, which is the only way in which filial obligations can be satisfied (Bellah 
93-94).
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The Classic of Filial Piety may have extended the concept of filial piety to serving 
one’s monarch in order to resolve the conflict between loyalty to one’s parents and 
loyalty to the state. It is noteworthy to state that, when acting in the role of government 
official, an individual is ultimately required to adopt two different identities—that of 
a son and that of a subject. The father holds the position of highest authority within 
the family structure, so that the son is therefore required to obey him; however, the 
monarch supersedes all in this hierarchy. The amalgamation of the political ethic of 
loyalty in combination with filial piety as a familial ethic has a significant impact on 
the monarch-minister relationship in terms of its development, which is now seen 
as being unequal and one-sided. The method and subsequent progression of filial 
piety has been described in The Classic of Filial Piety: 
The Master [Confucius] said: “The gentleman serves his parents with filial piety; thus 
his loyalty can be transferred to his sovereign. He serves his elder brother with brotherly 
deference; thus his respect can be transferred to his superior. He orders his family well; 
thus his good order can be transferred to his public administration. Therefore, when 
one cultivates one’s conduct within oneself, one’s name will be perpetuated for future 
generations.” (XiaoJing 15b-16a) 
The important concept here is “transference.” Filial piety must be made compatible 
with loyalty to the state, which means that the concept does not simply extend 
to the ruler-subject relationship but actually redefines it (Chow 304). From the 
perspective of a minister, filial piety could act as a substitute for loyalty and 
vice versa (Jung 134). However, when there is any form of discrepancy between 
the two elements—that of loyalty and filial piety—a minister would ultimately 
seek to achieve loyalty, which would subsequently be considered as fulfilling his 
obligations in a filial context (Hamilton 98). In the Classic of Filial Piety, the basis 
for imperial rule in relation to Confucian societies in East Asia was laid down by the 
interpretation of the link between filial piety and loyalty. Moreover, in the Classic 
of Filial Piety, the overall idea underlying filial piety was amended and shaped so 
as to conform to changes in the monarchical systems. In other words, Confucian 
societies’ rulers utilized the ethic of filial piety in order to encourage and foster the 
overall objective of supplementing common people’s education. 
The ultimate principle of Confucian filial piety has critically encouraged and 
emphasized the doctrine of transference of filial piety to loyalty—that is, those who 
strive to follow filial piety toward their parents will similarly show loyalty to their 
ruler. Furthermore, if an individual adopts filial piety and serves his parents, it is 
then required that such loyalty be replicated to serve the monarch. The monarchs 
of Confucian societies attempted to affirm their persona as Confucian sage kings 
and accordingly encourage loyalty and corresponding duty (Cheng 55-56). It 
was claimed that they were communicators of the sages, and they subsequently 
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determined their own standing as sage rulers while solidifying the overall political 
interpretation of ensuring loyalty above filial piety. With this in mind, it can be 
stated that the transference to loyalty from filial piety has been adopted in order to 
further encourage and strengthen the idea of loyalty to the monarch at the expense 
of filial piety (Cheng 63). Accordingly, filial piety has undergone promotion and 
encouragement within an imperial context, with the effect that filial piety has 
been politicized (Hwang 175-176). This raises a problem: Is loyalty to the ruler 
more important than filial piety of child to father? If we say that filial piety is the 
most fundamental form of obligation, does that undermine loyalty to the ruler? 
One answer is to treat filial piety as “ideological,” in the sense that rulers (or their 
theorists) have taken a deeply rooted cultural practice and sought to draw on it 
to justify political power. The other might be to argue that what is “fundamental” 
and what is the “highest duty” are two different things. Filial piety is fundamental 
in that it is the most basic relationship, but political loyalty entails a higher-level 
relationship. In any conflict between the two, loyalty to the ruler is ultimate. 
In this context, attention should be drawn to the doctrine of filial piety in 
the Three Bonds (Sangkang, 三綱),6 which demonstrates that the hierarchical 
relationship is an inviolable ethical norm by means of which the Confucian social 
order is preserved. The essence of the Three Bonds is that “the minister serves the 
king, the son serves the father, and the wife serves the husband. If the three are 
followed, the world will be in peace; if the three are violated, the world will be in 
chaos” (Tzu 75). The logic of the Three Bonds is therefore concerned with ensuring 
ruler authority over ministerial authority—father over son, and husband over wife. 
Paternal authority is fundamental, but ruler authority is higher. In consideration 
of the Three Bonds’ doctrine, ensuring the authority of the father over the son is 
considered to be the most fundamental of all elements with regard to the concept 
of filial piety. Hence, filial piety is the ultimate basis for all qualities and virtues in 
the Confucian tradition. 
As seen in the Confucian texts, the demanding force of propriety in Confucian 
tradition establishes the familial structure by bestowing the dominance of 
parents over children and husbands over wives. This form of dominant-
subordinate relationship has ultimately shaped the social and political structure 
of authoritarianism in East Asian Confucian societies. Of course, there is nothing 
wrong in either culture with ensuring the loyalty, compliance, and respect of young 
children towards adults, but it is evident that an authoritarian family structure 
determines the obedience of children to the parents, as elaborated by the practices 
of filial piety. As a result, the notion of filial piety is also applicable to those who 
have reached the “age of reason,” or adolescents. Indeed, it could be argued that 
a child has to reach a state of maturity in order to grasp his or her duties. In this 
context, an issue might arise if children are to obey their parents absolutely even 
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if parents should wrongfully exercise their authority over their children, or indeed 
if the parents should violate moral, social or legal rules. Put concretely: Should a 
child cover up the crime of a parent? As Rosemont and Ames asserts, Confucian 
“role ethics” is dependent on the pursuit of cosmic harmony in order to sustain the 
existing familial and communal order. This means that the father-son relationship 
should be maintained by emphasizing filial piety rather than drawing attention to 
the actual human conduct, even if this means that a son ignores his father’s crimes 
(17). It is clear that the main aspect of filial piety is blind obedience of children to 
parents.
The underlying ethic of filial piety is deeply rooted in the ability of children to 
repress antagonistic attitudes toward their parents (Yim 165). As Slote claims, the 
core of “Confucianism was based upon authoritarianism, and filial piety was the 
principal instrument through which it was established and maintained . . . . it has 
been, in fact, the modus through which the Confucian hierarchical relationship 
was maintained” (46). Confucian societies primarily appear to be shown as having 
a hierarchical structure, socially and politically, that is underpinned by yielding 
authority to one’s parents (particularly the father). The Confucian ethic of filial piety 
has created a “model person,” or an “ideal type,” in seeking filial obligation to one’s 
parents as well as the monarchy. The relationship between parents and children, 
based on the Confucian ethic of filial piety, has required the blind obedience of 
children toward parents. As far as filial piety is concerned, it has served as the 
socio-political basis of Confucian culture. Considering claims about the moral 
status of filial piety, the primary aspect of filial piety is the absolute obedience 
of children to parents; following this traditional idea, the ethic of filial piety 
has served the political requirements of societal order in Confucian East Asian 
culture. Accordingly, political control of the parent-child relationship, based on the 
prominence of filial piety, reinforces the consolidation of authoritarian values. In 
this sense, the relationship between parents and children should be reconsidered. 
Filial piety is ultimately a discourse that diminishes the power of the children in the 
interest of safeguarding the hierarchy of social difference. It effectively regulates the 
interests of the children by assigning obligations and debt to them. Subsequently, 
democratic and individualist rules of engagement are seemingly necessary to 
buttress the autonomy of individuals. In other words, instead of acknowledging the 
inequality of individuals based on the authoritarian relationship between parents 
and children, we need to guarantee free and autonomous individuals who could 
have equal rights. 
Drawing upon Zhou Dynasty culture, Confucius claims that “it is not till 
a child is three years old that it is allowed to leave the arms of its parents. And 
the three years’ mourning is universally observed throughout the empire” (Lau, 
Analects 17.21). The core value of filial piety of the ancient Chinese culture and 
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Confucian virtue ethics itself might offer a positive outlook in that parents’ 
unconditional love of their children is a universally humanistic emotion, and that 
children’s unconditional respect of their parents is also rational and humanistic. In 
this context, the conceptual aspect of filial piety could play a positive role in the 
conceptual system of Confucian virtue ethics. 
The arguments surrounding Gadamer and Habermas’ different philosophical 
epistemologies are plentiful. Furthermore, many studies have mainly discussed 
the central concepts and general philosophical differences between the two 
philosophers. However, no study has tried to investigate the concept of filial piety 
of Confucian culture in East Asia with respect to the philosophical debate between 
Gadamer and Habermas. This study initially intends to scrutinize a concrete and 
practical illustration of the practice of filial piety in Confucian East Asian culture 
by examining the abstract philosophical discussions of the two philosophers. 
Moreover, this paper applies the overly written Habermas–Gadamer debate on the 
Confucian practice of virtue ethics of filial piety. It is attentive to Confucian East 
Asian culture, which values filial piety and extends the concept to socio-political 
realms. Its primary emphasis is in recognizing the negative points, by focusing 
primarily on the factual aspects of filial piety in the current Confucian East Asian 
culture. Thus, the paper not only observes the negative effects of the factual aspect 
and actual practice of filial piety in the ways in which it is totally distorted in the 
contemporary Confucian East Asian culture, but it also provides a constructive 
critique of the practice of filial piety embedded in the conceptual scheme of 
Confucian virtue ethics.
The debate between Habermas and Gadamer is not between a defence of 
patriarchy versus egalitarianism, but over the role that traditions of patriarchy play 
in justifying political authority. Gadamer is not defending patriarchy but tradition, 
which in the case of East Asia draws on filial piety. The problem of how we define 
the status of filial piety will be of importance in understanding filial piety—and 
more broadly Confucianism—as “tradition” in the debate between Habermas and 
Gadamer.
4. GADAMER’S APPRECIATION OF TRADITION WITH RESPECT  
TO THE CONCEPT OF FILIAL PIETY
Richard Palmer argues that there are some affinities7 between Gadamer and 
Confucius or Confucianism (81-93). Allowing for differences in language and 
tradition, he argues that there are parallel concepts in the work of the two thinkers, 
such as “truth, textual contemporaneity (Zeitlichkeit), phronesis, application, 
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tradition and the historically-effected consciousness,8 conversation/dialogue, and 
solidarity” (83). The guiding concept is tradition (Palmer 91). Just as Gadamer 
stresses the importance of tradition as a precondition for human existence in a 
particular culture, Confucius also considers the concept of tradition of significant 
importance in Confucian societies. For Gadamer, tradition is important both for 
epistemology and morality. The intention of his research scheme, “philosophical 
hermeneutics,” is not to scrutinize how understanding occurs in the human 
sciences, but to consider understanding relative to the entire human experience 
of the world (Truth and Method [1989] xxiii). According to Gadamer, the notions 
of understanding and interpretation are intertwined, and a tradition is a horizon 
of understanding. Tradition equips the subject with the necessary conditions of 
understanding; they are what Gadamer terms “prejudices.” 
We can see parallels in Confucius. Gadamer argues that tradition is of 
importance because it carries “superiority in knowledge and insight” (Truth and 
Method [1989] 279). Following the Gadamerian notion of tradition, Alan Chan 
asserts that Confucian ethics entail “finding in tradition a reservoir of insight 
and truth” (“Confucian Ethics” 245). In the Analects, Confucius explicates the 
idea of tradition: “I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say and 
devoted to antiquity” (Lau, Analects 7.1), and “I am not one who was born with 
knowledge, but one who is fond of antiquity and quick to seek it” (Lau, Analects 
7.20). In this context, Confucius employs the concept of the Way (Dao, 道) and 
argues that people should follow the Way as they follow tradition. For Confucius 
we should trace and follow the knowledge, wisdom, and insight largely derived 
from the experience of the past and embedded in tradition. In so doing, we can 
learn the Way as a practice, which we take for granted, as a means of employing the 
conventional understanding and knowledge formed by tradition. In Confucius’s 
view, understanding and knowledge can only be practiced within the context of 
tradition. With reverence for tradition, individuals pursue the tenet of the Way and 
can easily grasp the teachings of Confucian filial piety:
It is natural enough to take the idea of filial piety as a component part of the [East 
Asians] respect for tradition….the idea of filial piety as obedience to the father can be 
taken to refer to the necessity to stand within a tradition in the seeking of wisdom and 
knowledge. Disobedience, in turn, can be taken to refer to the disregard of tradition, 
or traditional knowledge….to have filial piety is to have understanding of the tradition 
handed down by the fathers, and to have the appropriate fore-knowledge for the 
acquisition of knowledge and wisdom. One must acquire a perspective by immersing 
oneself in one’s tradition before one can embark on the task of interpretation and 
understanding…. [to be] a person with a certain level of understanding, a person with 
humanity (ren, 仁), one has to learn the way of the fathers, the way of tradition, or simply 
the Way. In other words, we could assume that filial piety means much more than just 
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to follow the instructions of one’s immediate parents; it means to follow the tradition, 
the Way. Thus, in Chapter 29 (29.1) of the Xunzi, we find: “Inside the home to be filial….
and outside the home to be courteous….constitute the minimal standard of human 
conduct….To follow the dictates of the Way rather than those of one’s father constitute 
the highest stand of conduct.” (Xunzi 29.1) 
As Palmer argues, Gadamer and Confucius have a similar view of the use of the 
concept of tradition (81). Confucius considers tradition to be a source of “insight 
and truth” (Chan, “Confucian Ethics” 245), and like Confucius, Gadamer defines 
tradition in terms of human self-understanding. Tradition, for Gadamer, is the 
carrier of a “superiority of knowledge and insight” with regard to truth (Truth 
and Method [1975] 280). The ethic of filial piety likewise requires the obedience 
of children to parents within the context of a tradition, which underpins their 
parents’ knowledge and wisdom. According to Gadamer, tradition determines 
our being and understanding; it is expressed in and through our “prejudices,” and 
it provides a horizon from which we may view the world. Indeed, human beings 
must necessarily operate with a “tradition of traditions” (Truth and Method [1975] 
261). In the sense that we can shape tradition, we are free; certainly, tradition sets 
limits, but tradition presents us with options or choices. Every tradition is thus a 
“living tradition”—that is, continually changing and adapting. Accordingly, history 
is not the “no longer existing,” but rather, past and present are mutually entangled 
through the notion of self-understanding. 
In Gadamer’s view, tradition serves as the ground for understanding. If tradition 
is that which moulds and directs our perspectives, then understanding is a “fusion 
of horizons” (Truth and Method [1989] 302). Such a notion demonstrates that 
we are never separate from that which we strive to understand. Furthermore, 
for Gadamer, to live and to be is to stand within tradition. All understanding is 
grounded in tradition, and the idea of the “fusion of horizons”—which remains 
central to historical understanding—can ultimately only result from a meditation 
upon tradition. Tradition is an ongoing process of the fusion of horizon of the 
present and of the past. Gadamerian analysis of the fusion of horizons appears 
to be that the “horizon of the present is continuously in the process of being 
formed,” as we continually test our prejudices in our encounter with tradition. Our 
prejudices are the product of history, so that studying history—understanding our 
tradition—is a critical process. This shows the falsehood and naïveté of an isolated 
formation of a horizon of the present without recognizing or acknowledging the 
necessity of knowing tradition (Gadamer Truth and Method [1989] 306). Along 
with Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition serving an important role in human society, 
tradition is grounded in “prejudices.” While prejudice forms the basis of tradition, 
the totality of tradition is itself the means by which we evaluate, or criticize, our 
prejudices. There is therefore a feedback mechanism between prejudice and 
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tradition, making tradition a critical tool, but one that is not “abstract.” It is not 
a “view from nowhere.” This is important when we seek to understand East Asian 
culture and, specifically, filial piety. . It allows us to differentiate between filial piety 
as an essential element of social order and the language of filial piety as a mere 
instrument of domination. If we take obedience to parents to be a prejudice, then 
we can assess that prejudice, first, by locating it within the tradition of filial piety. 
Second, we assess filial piety with a broader Confucian culture. Filial piety is part 
of that Confucian culture, but that culture simultaneously allows for a distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate exercises of parental power. 
Such a form of moral understanding, which is present in the concept of 
Confucian tradition, seems also to be a characteristic trait of the Gadamer’s notion 
of tradition. In this sense, it is easy to see how one is able to reach an understanding 
of tradition from the perspective of Confucius. The notion of tradition could be 
considered as the ultimate root of the moral teachings of Confucius. As Chan 
argues, the overall function of tradition, especially in consideration of Confucius’ 
Analects, “lies in its mediating position between Dao as the will of Heaven and 
Dao as the way of [the true gentleman] (Chün-tzu, 君子)”9 (“Philosophical 
Hermeneutics” 430). According to Confucius, Confucian hermeneutics thus 
emphasizes the Way as a means to maintain tradition. Ng argues that learning and 
following “the Dao is to realize the moral and ritual order established by the ancient 
sages” (“Chinese Philosophy” 378). Compliance with the Way is a prerequisite for 
the recognition of norms and values, which are shaped by tradition. In Confucian 
tradition, therefore, the practice of filial piety is the fundamental basis that ensures 
norms and values grounded in the employment of moral and practical exercises. 
In so doing, filial piety furnishes self-understanding of one’s own tradition, based 
on conventionally inherited wisdom and knowledge; its practice functions as a 
conventional norm, which conforms to existing tradition. Thus, both Gadamer 
and Confucius have a shared understanding regarding “tradition,” which plays a 
significant role within the context of human existence. The concept of filial piety 
has been recognized as central to East Asian culture and has been a tool for the 
ruling ideology of Confucian societies in East Asia. The teachings of Confucius 
essentially reflect a “conservative” orientation. Thus, it can be said that Gadamer’s 
thesis is also conservative, and there is a fairly similar stance between Gadamer 
and Confucius in terms of the importance and interpretation of tradition. While 
Gadamer places focus on tradition, Confucius places importance on the custom of 
antiquity. Confucius recognizes the ethical principles embedded within tradition, 
while Gadamer appropriates the significance of tradition.  
Gadamer argues that the most important role of philosophy lies in the 
understanding of the ontological nature of human existence—that his primary 
philosophical inquiries depend on the understanding of the human being in 
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relation to its finite existence. According to Gadamer, the civilization of human 
beings would not have been preserved without the force of tradition, and the claim 
of tradition could embrace the ideological distortion of overarching prejudices at 
all levels. In other words, all human activities could be interpreted from within 
a tradition in explicating the understanding of the ontological nature of human 
existence, so that even the ideological distortion can be subject to tradition. In 
short, Gadamer defends the force of tradition as positive in emphasizing that 
every aspect of human understanding is ultimately connected to tradition and 
determined by it (“Reply” 288). 
5. HABERMAS’S CHALLENGE ON GADAMER: CRITICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE 
CONCEPT OF FILIAL PIETY
Although Habermas and Gadamer agree that reaching an agreement is at the 
heart of resolving both practical and epistemic conflicts between individuals, they 
differ on the issue of how an agreement between interlocutors is achieved. Both 
Gadamer and Habermas emphasize dialogue, but the importance that dialogue 
plays for each of them is significantly different. Gadamer sees dialogue as a way 
of coming to an agreement between partners. It involves thinking about how 
interlocutors may reach an understanding of the subject matter at issue. However, 
his emphasis on dialogue lacks a methodology on how to communicate—that is, 
criteria for successful communication—as well as a regulative ideal of dialogue, 
or a conception of rules constraining dialogue. His philosophical hermeneutics 
simply scrutinizes the basic existential structure of human existence (Dasein), 
concentrating only on the disclosure of “Is,” rather than placing in question the 
“Is” by reference to normative standards (“ought”). On the other hand, Habermas’s 
position on communication sets out what is required for a conversation, such that 
dialogical partners are oriented to arrive at a counterfactual understanding of what 
is at issue. 
In Habermas’s account, reaching understanding is a process of reaching 
agreement “among speaking and acting subjects” (The Theory of Communicative 
Action 286). According to Habermas, communicative action pertains to action 
oriented towards reaching an understanding. His primary concern is to establish 
coercion-free communication. With communicative action, relations can be 
established between actors who are able to speak and act so to achieve mutual 
consensus. Here, we can see how Habermas links reasons and actions through 
the medium of language. The concept of communicative rationality, he argues, 
depends primarily on the “consensus-bringing force of argument speech,” in 
which participants overcome their subjective points of view and reach mutual 
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understanding based on rationally motivated agreement (Habermas, The Theory 
of Communicative Action 10). Thus, the participants (speakers and hearers) can 
ultimately attain uncoerced, unifying consensus.  In Habermas’s account, the goal 
of speech is to arrive at an understanding between conversational participants who 
can coordinate actions in order to reach agreement through intersubjective and 
reciprocal communication between a speaker and a hearer. Habermas considers 
that the meaning of an utterance is fundamentally a shared understanding between 
a speaker and a hearer—not “shared” in an instrumental sense, but shared based on 
a presupposition of equality between speaker and hearer. Without this recognition 
of equality, a theory of meaning would be reduced to a conflict between participants 
(Finlayson 38). In Habermas’s view, reaching understanding is thus an impossible 
task, unless there is consensual agreement of participants in communication with 
regard to a particular object, rule, or state of affairs. 
The mutual understanding between the speaker and the hearer serves as 
the basis for Habermas’s communicative action theory. However, a problem 
concerning the lack of mutual understanding between the interlocutors, parents 
and children, arises when the filial piety of Confucian East Asian culture is put 
into the context of Habermas’s communicative action theory. In this particular 
situation, the speaker (parents) can force a conversation onto the hearer (children), 
and the conversation may turn into a verbally mediated exercise of power—that 
is, unequal communication on the basis of excessive authority of parents over 
children, rather than one of genuine communication, as Habermas claimed. In 
addition, the weaknesses of Gadamer’s explanation of communication, and the 
corresponding strengths of Habermas’s position, can be illuminated in reference 
to filial piety. Without a methodology to assess valid speech and normative rules 
regulating speech, we are incapable of coming to a judgement over the legitimacy of 
personal—and, importantly, political—relations grounded in filial piety. Filial piety 
powerfully illustrates the difference between Habermas and Gadamer: without 
criteria for assessing valid and invalid speech, any kind of power relationship, 
however oppressive, can be subsumed under “filial piety.”
The Confucian virtue of filial piety, which requires reciprocal care between 
parent and child, is our starting point for being human (Q. Liu 236). Such a 
relationship is not unique to the East. To be sure, there are Western conceptions of 
the family as a moral entity. However, what distinguishes the Confucian ideal is the 
subordination of the child to the parent. Confucianism emphasizes authority over 
liberty and responsibility over rights, but it lacks the tradition of an individual’s 
claim of rights against the state, which would counterbalance parental authority. 
In other words, if the practice of communication between parents and children is 
mainly dependent on parents’ excessive dominance over children in order to keep 
parents’ illegitimate authority, then this kind of speech act might not be carried out 
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as a reciprocal understanding between them. In this sense, it is evident that mutual 
understanding based on a rationally motivated conversation between actors 
(parents and children) in speech situations seems to be an impossible mission. 
Moreover, an exercise of lopsided coercion of parents’ authority over the children 
might damage the intersubjective understanding between parents and children. 
Hence, Habermas’s theory of communicative action can serve as reasonable 
ground on which to transform the problems raised by filial piety. It is important to 
underline that filial piety is not merely a relationship between child and parent and 
thus part of the private sphere, but it also underwrites political authority. 
In general, critical theory is not merely concerned with describing social reality, 
but it also seeks to synthesize a respectable description of social reality with 
a critical or normative ideal. Critique can be achieved through the very notion 
of criticism: by standing back from existing practices and refusing to accept the 
normativity of what is “given,” the critical theorist presupposes a standpoint of 
“ought” in the face of “is.” Questions of normativity are only ever posed when what 
exists is no longer taken for granted. As Wellmer argues: “An ethical question first 
exists when the agreements of actions with the factually valid norms of a society are 
no longer recognized as the final instance of a ‘justification’ of these actions” (293). 
And as Habermas suggests, we should differentiate between social norms which 
are justified by nothing more than an appeal to de facto social norms, from social 
norms which are legitimately and reasonably valid (The Theory of Communicative 
Action 287). The idea of a critical social theory has at its core a fundamental tension, 
which is derived from the intention of critical social theory to generate a rational 
critique. The outcome of such a justificatory process should ultimately be rational, 
simply because it is fundamentally built on reason. The idea is that any social agent 
who has any ability to speak or act would ultimately be rationally convinced of 
the rightness associated with justifying the norm (Held 330). The outcomes of 
rational justification processes are acceptable if the processes by which they were 
arrived at are universally valid (Hoy and McCarthy 172-173). Thus, Habermas seeks 
to “shake the dogmatism of life-practices” (The Theory of Communicative Action 
357) by means of critical reflection whereby human beings can defy tradition. In 
his view, Gadamer underestimates the power of critical reflection (Mendelson 59). 
He argues that Gadamer’s recognition of “prejudice for the rights of prejudices 
certified by tradition denies the power of critical reflection” (Habermas, The Theory 
of Communicative Action 237). In this sense, it is worth noting that we might be able 
to rule out and reject the unjust or illegitimate tradition, which is fundamentally 
grounded on “systematically distorted” dogmatic forces. Thus, tradition could be 
transformed by means of employing the power of critical reflection.
As I have explored earlier, Confucius and Gadamer have a shared understanding 
in which tradition should be understood as the appropriation of norms and values 
Kim / The Concept of Filial Piety in East Asian Confucian Culture 55
Kritika Kultura 33/34 (2019/2020): 55–064 © Ateneo de Manila University
<http://journals.ateneo.edu/ojs/kk/>
embedded within existing tradition. For Habermas, a Gadamerian “justification” 
of filial piety is in effect an ideological reinforcement of existing power relations. 
Gadamer is, in a negative sense, a conservative. As Chan points out: “Confucius 
can be described as a ‘conservative’ thinker in the technical sense that he regards 
certain values and insights derived from tradition to be of normative significance, 
and which must therefore be carefully conserved” in urging us to follow the wisdom 
of antiquity (“Confucian Ethcis” 246). Even Warnke who appropriates Gadamer’s 
philosophical standpoint claims that Gadamer is, “fundamentally conservative” 
in that human agents cannot overcome the authority of tradition to which they 
belong (136). 
Having reviewed the textual evidence of Confucianism, it can be stated that filial 
piety has served as a resource for sustaining the hierarchical family structure of East 
Asian Confucian culture. It is noteworthy that filial piety cannot be diminished or 
lessened so that it is merely duty; ultimately, it is an important virtue in its own 
right. As has been previously emphasized, the relationship between parent and 
child is not balanced nor equal, which is what makes filial piety the perfect model 
when implementing a relationship with a ruler-subject nature (Tan and Chan 8). 
As Sor-hoon Tan maintains, the idea of filial piety “is fraught with patriarchal and 
authoritarian prejudices and would thus require reformation if it were to contribute 
to the development of [Confucian East Asian] culture” (2-3). Thus, viewed from a 
Habermasian perspective, filial piety is a case of ideological distortion. In particular, 
the patriarchal relationship between the superior and inferior suggests that there 
is an unequal relationship. In this regard, Habermas’s pronouncement of impartial 
adjudication of conflicting rights claims is more relevant than Gadamer’s seemingly 
uncritical acceptance of tradition.
The concept of filial piety presupposes inequality between parents and children 
in Confucian East Asian societies. In this sense, the relationship can be judged as 
not merely unjust in an intuitive sense, but also irrational and unfair. If we follow 
Habermas’s argument, then the role of communicative competence relies on the 
consensus between individuals who are committed to reach an understanding. 
The assumption of this ideal speech situation lies in rationally conceived action 
among individual participants to reach an understanding. Habermas’s model 
of communicative competence with regard to the example of filial piety seems 
suggestive, because it conceives of the equal and autonomous intersubjective 
relationship between two parties—the parents and the children—as primarily 
based on rational action. Without an actual consensual relationship between the 
two parties, as Habermas argues, it is likely to become a monological relationship 
rather than a dialogical one among communicating individuals.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the debate between Gadamer and Habermas associated 
with the practice of filial piety in Confucian East Asian culture. While Gadamer 
acknowledges tradition and authority as the unavoidable human condition given 
the finitude of human existence, Habermas criticizes Gadamer’s ontological-
existential position by demanding an exercise of reason—or critical reflection. 
Upon such critical reflection, according to Habermas, illegitimate tradition can 
be overcome. It is argued that Habermas’s communicative action theory is better 
able to do justice to the basis for the normative grounding of authority, so that it 
endorses Habermas’s charge that Gadamer hypostatizes tradition. 
Gadamer does produce a strong impression of conservatism in his defence of 
tradition, which it exercises over us—a point that Habermas quickly raises against 
Gadamer. Is all tradition welcome? Is all tradition truthful and acceptable? Certainly, 
these are questions that any reader of Gadamer could raise legitimately, but more 
so Habermas who would see in tradition the source of prejudice and ideological 
beliefs (Habermas, “On Hermeneutics” 316; Habermas, Logic of Social Science 168). 
We can apply these questions to filial piety. Children find themselves “thrown into” 
a culture and cannot choose it, but there may be scope for criticism if they believe 
that their father is not acting within the tradition but abusing it. This requires, on 
the part of children, an analysis of the conditions of the practice of filial piety. In 
essence, the child asks: does filial piety require that I obey this order? If my father 
commits murder does filial piety require that I conceal the crime? Since filial piety 
is connected to wider social and political duties, it is likely that a filially pious child 
will conclude that he should not conceal the crime. But can that decision be made 
without recourse to standards of rationality that transcend the practice? This is the 
crux of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer. Habermas argues that there 
are trans-cultural standards, while Gadamer appears to rejects such standards. 
Habermas contrasts critical-theoretical reflection with Gadamer’s position. 
For Habermas, tradition can be overcome through critical reflective thinking. In 
other words, although the conventional value system might constitute the horizon 
of value system of each individual in a particular culture, as exemplified by the 
example of filial piety in the Confucian East Asian case, the critical assessment 
of such could ultimately reveal the fundamentally conflictual structure of society. 
Against the appropriation of merely conventional value, the task is to reveal hidden 
pre-understandings, that is, forces that condition us without our knowledge. Filial 
piety might have served as a value system—prejudice or tradition in Gadamer’s 
terminology—in Confucian East Asian culture; nonetheless, it has very significant 
implications for the autonomy of each individual. As aforementioned in this paper, 
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filial piety is an implicit rejection of the reciprocal and free relationship between 
parents and their children, and is thus incompatible with freedom and equality. 
The fundamental value of filial piety is inseparable from Confucian East Asian 
culture. Critical thinking aims to reveal the conflictual structure of historicity. This 
recognition subsequently opens up a path leading towards something which can be 
cautiously referred to as critical interpretation. When we become aware of power 
relations in all interpretive situations, critique allows a multiplicity of conflicting 
perspectives or interpretations to be acknowledged. Critique, in this sense, takes 
place as a force which fundamentally liberates the conflict of interpretations, taking 
as its guide the maxim that no one’s voice should be silenced. Critical reflection can 
make explicit the implicit presuppositions of, for example, particular interpretative 
situations (as shown in the concept of filial piety in Confucian East Asian culture) 
even if it is not possible to make explicit all pre-understandings. 
Certainly Gadamer’s insistence on tradition has been criticized from the “left” 
as “conservative” (Bernstein 295; Wolin 44). In particular, these critics attack the 
notion of a tradition for not allowing any scope for the critique of ideology residing 
within tradition (Eagleton 72; Caputo 112; Habermas, Logic of Social Science 168). 
John Caputo claims that Gadamer is critically concerned with looking backward, 
involved with how truth gets passed down and never places such truth in question—
that is, “the deep unity of tradition is always safe” (111). Likewise, Terry Eagleton 
maintains that Gadamer’s notion of tradition implies “a grossly complacent theory 
of history, which is not a place of struggle, but almost “a club of the like-minded” 
(72).
Every society has its own conventional values and norms, and filial piety is 
regarded as one of the most influential characteristics of Confucian ethics. The 
practice of filial piety has acquired its normative power as a result of two thousand 
years of cultural development, underpinned by both practice and ideology. Gadamer 
argues that it is impossible for those brought up in such a tradition to transcend it, 
because human beings are finite and historical. If we follow Gadamer’s standpoint, 
then there is no standpoint outside Confucian culture that could ultimately allow 
members of that culture to reject filial piety. This does not mean that criticism is not 
possible, but rather that there is no ultimate grounding or justification. However, 
for Habermas, the ethical practice in a particular tradition and cultural context 
can and should be modified through critical reflection. A critical undertaking 
can never be completed; it creates an object, which must in its turn be criticized. 
Critique must be constantly started again, precisely because the dimension of 
conflict giving the critique the space to operate affects also the critical undertaking 
itself. In this context, Gadamer’s position is merely the appropriation of the norms 
and conventions of the status quo. Thus, Habermas tries to solve the problems 
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surrounding tradition and authority from an ethical and normative standpoint, 
which allows for a judgment of right or wrong. 
The primary focus of this paper has been the explication of the Habermas-
Gadamer debate against the background of East Asian culture, specifically the 
practice of filial piety. Although this paper is not merely focusing on the concept 
of filial piety itself, the practice nevertheless powerfully illustrates the difference 
between Habermas and Gadamer. Without criteria for assessing normative rules, 
any kind of power relationship, however oppressive, can be subsumed under 
“filial piety.” As has been maintained throughout the paper, the concept of filial 
piety presupposes the authoritarian inequality between parents and children, or 
to be more precise, between a father and his children. In this sense, the unequal 
authoritarian relationship between parents and children in Confucian East Asian 
culture can be judged as not merely unjust in an intuitive sense, but also irrational 
and unfair. Habermas and Gadamer might agree that there is nothing wrong with 
the reciprocal relationship between parents and children if it is connected to 
the emotional bond between them. However, there is a clear disparity between 
Habermas and Gadamer with regard to how they might interpret and possibly 
justify filial piety. The traditional idea of filial piety in Confucian East Asian culture 
has reinforced the absolute authority of the parents over the children. In other 
words, having respect for the parents is the expected behavior of children because it 
is one of the most important obligatory values in Confucian East Asian culture. The 
children’s attitude toward their parents is the primary value in evaluating whether 
the children are filial or unfilial. Thus, disobedience to one’s parents is considered 
unfilial behavior in Confucian East Asian culture. It means that children have to 
obey their parents without question. 
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Glossary of Chinese Characters and Books
Analects (論語)




Sangkang (Three Bonds, 三綱)
Shi (scholars, interior officers, 士) 
Three Bonds (三綱)
Xiao (filial piety, 孝)
XiaoJing (The Classic of Filial Piety, 孝經)
Zhong (loyalty, 忠)
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Notes
1. This article is based on an excerpt of author’s unpublished doctoral thesis, and 
a rewritten and restructured version of it. Kim, Donghyun. Reason, Tradition, 
and Authority: A Comparative Study of Habermas and Gadamer. (Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation). University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. 2011.
2. I use Chinese characters which correspond to English in order to minimize the 
confusion of the original meaning of the Chinese characters. 
3. The philosophical debate between Habermas and Gadamer is of importance in 
view of the concepts of tradition, authority, and reason. Habermas primarily 
pinpoints Gadamer’s espousal of tradition as an irrational and unconditional 
entity by emphasizing the role of the critical reflection of reason (“A Review 
of Gadamer’s Truth and Method” 335-363). In his reply to Habermas’ criticism, 
Gadamer defends the role of tradition in his philosophical hermeneutics as 
“interpretative” logos that can be understood as both language and reason carrying 
out its critical strength (“Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology” 
274-292). However, the commitment of interpretative design in Gadamer’s 
appropriation of tradition can be interpreted as merely a conservative impression. 
The debate between the two mainly lies in the acceptance of uncritical tradition 
and the recognition of ideology critique provided by Gadamer and Habermas, 
respectively. The extensive commentaries and more detailed descriptions 
regarding the debate between Gadamer and Habermas can be found in Alan 
How’s book The Habermas–Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social: Back 
to Bedrock. Averbury, 1995.
4. In the first chapter of The Classic of Filial Piety, Confucius argues that “filial 
piety is the root of all virtue” (XiaoJing, 1) and “All virtue means the five virtuous 
principles, the constituents of humanity (ren, 仁): benevolence, righteousness, 
propriety, knowledge, and fidelity.” See XiaoJing, http://www.chinapage.com/
confucius/xiaojing-be.html. Accessed on 17 June 2017.
5. The name of the author of The Classic of Filial Piety is unknown. It is attributed 
to a conversation between Confucius (孔子) and one of his disciples named Zeng 
Zi (曾子).
6. This idea is first seen in the Hanfeitzu, in the section on “Zhongxiao” (“Loyalty and 
Filial Piety”).
7. Ng also argues that there are affinities between Gadamer and Confucius. He 
asserts that Gadamer’s philosophy “is seemingly consonant with the Confucian 
conception of knowledge—the veneration of tradition and the ascription of 
authority to the classical; the ontological sense of continuity and mutuality with 
history and culture; the resistance to the atomistic objectification of nature; the 
immersion of the self in the world through moral self-cultivation as fiduciary 
commitment; and the sober acceptance of the integrity of language as the 
embodiment of reality” (“Chinese Philosophy” 377).
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8. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is concerned with the ontological 
interpretation of human life by understanding and recognizing that there are 
overpowering and uncontrollable forces which are set against a subjective 
historical nature. From this angle, one which has generated much controversy 
among his critics, the use of his term “philosophical hermeneutics” ultimately rests 
upon temporal completion in relation to the “historically effected consciousness.” 
For Gadamer, the mode of human understanding is fundamentally conditioned 
by the “historically effected consciousness” because human beings are never free 
from historical conditions.
9. Confucius claimed that there was an indivisible connection between tradition 
and the Way (Dao, 道); people should follow the Way as they follow tradition. 
Gadamer’s acknowledgement of tradition and the practice of the Way in 
Confucian philosophy serve as the foundation for those who seek understanding 
and knowledge. In the Confucian understanding of tradition, it is in this sense 
that man can be said to make the Way great. The Way (Dao, 道) may be seen 
as the actualization of the moral virtues of the true gentleman (Chün-tzu, 君子). 
Confucius describes the role of the true gentleman in Analects 1.2: “A superior man 
is devoted to the cultivation of fundamentals; when they are firmly established, 
the Dao will grow” (Lau, Analects 1.2). 
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